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ABSTRACT

As the structure of modern organizations shifts, so correspondingly must the methodologies which underlie the evaluation
and development of the security posture of their information systems. We have witnessed an ever-growing gap between
organizational policy and technology. We have also witnessed an ever increasing complexity of decisions regarding the
planning and design of IS security.
Within this paper, we propose a decision support framework consistent with security and decision theory and develop a
model of the decision analysis space suitable for multiple criteria decision making (MCDM). The adoption of MCDM
techniques within the context of this model can show inherent trade-offs between alternatives in a security decision,
encapsulate qualitative as well as quantitative elements within the analysis space, and facilitate group-decision making
thereby dealing with conflicting perspectives of multiple stakeholders. The paper concludes with a demonstration of the
proposed model through a case study conducted with a major financial services provider.
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INTRODUCTION

A recently conducted study (Whitman, 2003) indicates that 99% of companies surveyed utilize the Internet for purposes
ranging from providing information to ordering and value-chain integration with business partners. Yet an astonishingly low
63% of these organizations indicated that they possess a consistent security policy. A major study conducted by the
Computer Security Institute (CSI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicated that over 90% of organizations
surveyed had faced systems security related incidents in the past year, and estimated total financial losses from such incidents
at $455,848,000 (Power, 2002). It is quite obvious that information systems (IS) security is becoming a critical issue which
can directly impact on many aspects of business operations, and that security violations are indeed occurring and resulting in
real losses.
The rapid technology- and market-driven changes which have characterized the shifting business horizon as pertains to
organizational structures and the technical environment have created a need for corresponding flexibility in such
organizations’ ability to ascertain and understand the changing nature and conditions of the security of their information
systems. Too often, security is treated by top management as largely a technical concern. Often, this attitude results in
overly generalized policies with a systematic effect characterized by an ever-widening gap between policy and technology,
and a corresponding disconnection between decision-makers and technical management (Baskerville and Siponen, 2001;
Ferris, 1994) within the organization.
Increasingly, the sheer volume of specialist knowledge necessary to a purely functional security approach is overwhelming.
Moreover, a multitude of factors may be involved which concern the value and significance of a particular asset to an
organization. These factors may be entirely non-technical in nature, or qualitative and subjective. Unfortunately, existing
methodologies for security decision-making offer limited options and are tailored to the technical problems of identifying
assets and matching threats to controls, and provide virtually no support for evaluating trade-off among various factors.
It is our contention that multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) techniques can be usefully applied to this problem domain to
significant advantage over traditional security management approaches, in eliciting stakeholder preferences, explicitly
showing trade-offs inherent in security decisions, and dealing with conflicting priorities between stakeholders. We contend
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that such decision support techniques can be utilized to improve managerial perception of security and in turn to facilitate
development of correct notions of the organization-wide significance of security, and to provide a sound theoretical basis for
formulating security decisions.
Within this paper, we extend the existing literature on decision support for information security planning to develop a
framework of the decision process itself, consistent with security and decision theory, and identify within the framework the
specific portions of the process where decision support techniques can be utilized. From this, we then develop a model of the
decision analysis space suitable for MCDM that incorporates the traditional security categories of threat, asset, and control,
and show how this model may be used to describe analysis spaces useful to security management. We conclude with a case
study conducted through use of a sample application of the model in consultation with a major financial services provider.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY DECISIONS

Traditionally, information systems security has been considered an issue of import primarily to the IT department of an
organization (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000). It has consistently been the case that the organization-wide importance of
information security has been all but ignored by IT management and top executives (Whitman, 2003). Oftentimes, managers
also lack the technical knowledge necessary to communicate organizational concerns in a way that has relevance to
operational personnel, and fail to treat security problems as an ongoing concern (Wood, 1997). Security is treated as a
specialized technical matter, left to the responsibility of the IT department. Treatment of security as a purely technical
concern is the result of the traditional view of information security as the responsibility of the IT department, combined with
a lack of grounding in theoretical principles of security management and insufficient knowledge of managerial security
controls (Straub and Welke, 1998).
Current security planning techniques involve primarily a combination of two aspects: policy making, which is intended to
give strategic direction to information security efforts, and operational procedures and implementation, which supplies an
essentially tactical function to the organization, and which is very much slanted towards specific behavioral regulations and
the technical aspect of security. Unfortunately, in practice, as well as the security literature, we see a widespread
discontinuity between these two aspects. Too often, what is characterized as an ad-hoc approach to security planning (Rees
et al., 2003; Gaskell, 2000) predominates, wherein there is little concern beyond that raised by the publicity generated by the
latest security breach which is brought to managerial attention, often without an understanding of the true significance of the
publicized threat to a particular organization.
Implemented policies are often generalized and intended to give broad direction, but too frequently, this result in
fundamentally ineffective security policy with little operational relevance, which fails to remain timely with changes in the
security environment, and which is inconsistent with and irrelevant to strategic objectives (Rees, Banyopadhyay, and
Spafford, 2003). The lack of a mediating influence between awareness of publicized vulnerabilities and the impact of such
vulnerabilities on the individual organization’s security posture also has undue influence on decision-making. It can result in
fundamentally reactive security decisions, wherein there is little concern beyond prevention of the latest publicized breach
serving as a model guiding future actions (Rees et al., 2003).
Policy-based techniques have identified and sought to alleviate this problem through suggestions for establishment of metalevels of policy (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002), and broad and comprehensive guidelines and models have been presented,
many derived from experience through military and governmental use. Such guidelines and meta-policies for development
of security policy may be useful to an organization for improving its policy making process, but alone they do not adequately
address the real “gap” – that of communication between upper management and operational IT security management – which
exists in the security decision process between security planning and implementation.
Perception of IT-related risk, including information security, can vary greatly from the theoretical concepts of probability
theory used to quantify the possibility of future outcomes. These perceptions, of course, form the basis for consequent future
decisions. It has been shown that managers are largely unaffected by probability estimates and tend to consider a “risky”
choice as one which might have a very negative outcome, regardless of its actual probability of occurrence (March and
Shapira, 1987) – thus the ordinary managerial decision process cannot be considered to be governed by statistical evaluation
methods common to risk management theory. As Bandyopadhyay, Mykytyn, and Mykytyn (1999) conclude, IS managers
need to change their way of thinking about risk.
In effect, a security decision consists of eliciting the values, preferences, and priorities of the stakeholders in the decision, and
in understanding how the trade-offs between potential alternatives will affect the extent to which the choice is able to achieve
the objective of the decision. Accordingly, security decisions are amenable to techniques suitable for making decisions in the
presence of multiple, and often conflicting criteria.

Submitted to the Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004

2

Decision Support in Information Systems Security

Such techniques are referred to as multiple criteria decision making techniques (MCDM). Multi-criteria decision making
(MCDM) is a research area in decision theory which is intended to account for multiple attributes and criteria in the decisionmaking process. MCDM encompasses a wide variety of techniques, and classically it is considered to incorporate the
economic paradigm, advanced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), of expected utility theory applied to multiple
criteria. Multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT), as a representative example of a class of such techniques, utilizes this notion
explicitly in the decision process (Olson, 1996). An MCDM approach can facilitate systematic thinking about the problem
domain, through its provision of a framework for defining alternatives and comparing their performance in chosen objectives
(Thomas and Samson, 1986). Additionally, MCDM methods are well-suited to issues which can arise in group decision
making, including conflicting evaluations of trade-offs and multiple divergent viewpoints.
MCDM also facilitates negotiation, because it serves to move the discussion away from the specific alternatives under
discussion and focus the process towards understanding the values underlying the overall decision objectives and clearly
illustrating the trade-offs between alternatives. This encourages stakeholders to consider their common interests and to
mitigate the effect of defensive dispute, which often occur after a stakeholder is invested in a particular alternative (Raiffa,
1982). Discussions based on value also can serve as sources of new and unconsidered alternatives (Gregory and Keeney,
1994). These discussions naturally lead themselves to support of strategic and holistic thought about a problem domain, and
thus MCDM methods can serve to address less quantifiable policy-based objectives and to show directly how existing factors
within an organization lend themselves to support these broader, directive goals.
While MCDM techniques have been applied extensively in various application domains, their application in the management
and planning of information system security is almost non-existent. Available tools and methods for security risk planning
rely on simplistic techniques that ignore behavioral aspects entirely and cannot account for the multidimensional effects of
controls (Straub and Welke 1998), they are atheoretical (Hoffman 1989), and they do not facilitate the type of decision
making involving cross-functional organizational components which are characteristic behaviors of a modern emergent
organization as it is described by Baskerville and Sipponen (2001). These techniques are biased toward what is characterized
in the literature as a technocratic orientation (Willison, Backhouse 2003). Baskerville (1993) presents a review of some of
the information system security design methods in the context of information system development.
A DECISION SUPPORT FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY DECISION PROCESS

The security decision process itself can be characterized as a case of the general theoretical model for decision-making
advanced by Simon (1960), which consists of three phases: Intelligence, Design, and Choice. The model has been further
extended in the security management literature (Straub and Welke, 1998) to incorporate a total of four phases: the recognition
of need or a potential security vulnerability (this corresponds to Intelligence in the Simon model), risk analysis to assess the
perceived danger from identified threats, generation of alternative solutions based upon the perceived criticality identified in
the analysis (the Design phase), and the planning decision itself is made, with one alternative being chosen out of the possible
solutions (the Choice phase).
Figure 1 presents a generalized framework for information system security. The framework follows the general theoretical
decision-making model (Simon 1960) and incorporates and extends the three primary categories of managerial perception
identified by Straub and Welke (1998). In this framework, security risk planning is given as a process occurring in four
phases. First, a security problem or need is recognized (problem formulation and threat determination); second, risk analysis
assesses the significance and nature of the identified problem; third, alternative solutions are generated based on perceived
criticality; fourth, the planning decision is made (one alternative among identified possibilities is selected).
According to Straub and Welke (1998), the managerial decision making process is influenced by the managerial perception
of security, which in turn depends on knowledge of the global environment, knowledge of effective controls, and knowledge
of the current environment.
Knowledge of Global Environment includes knowledge of threats and vulnerabilities. Primary sources of information about
the global security environment: the mass media, specialist “watchdog” organizations like CERT, and communication
through formal and informal channels, within the organization itself. Managerial knowledge, organizational learning through
security awareness training and external sources of knowledge (consultants, technology-focused expert systems for
operational decision support) comprise the organizational Knowledge of Effective Controls. Knowledge of Current
Environment includes identified assets and implemented controls as well as architectural details of the organizational
information system. Incorporated with those, the “Operational Security Environment” represents the current overall security
posture of the information system by defining acceptable levels of security and then locating the current status within that
continuum (von Solms et al., 1994). It serves as a generalized status indicator which should be at the forefront of managerial
attention if it should fall beyond a certain threshold.
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Figure 1. A decision support framework for information systems security
Besides managerial perception, the decision process depends on a definition of the decision analysis space in terms of
alternatives and criteria against which these alternatives are evaluated. In addition, the decision process needs to capture the
preference structure of the stakeholders toward the identified criteria and alternatives. Finally, the feedback effect of the
decision process itself is incorporated, showing the iterative nature of the perceptual model, as it would be used in practice,
and how decisions will in turn affect the environment from which future perceptions are drawn.
The model of the decision analysis space

The dimensions comprising the security model are the elements of the security triplet – asset, threat, and control. Identifying
sets of these basic dimensions is the first step in formulating an analysis space – eliciting concerns of the problem domain
from stakeholders. We can express a list of identified assets, threats and controls as a set of vectors: VA = {A1, A2, …, An,…,
AN}, VT = {T1, T2, …, Tm, …,TM}, and VC = {C1, C2, …, Cr, …, CR}, respectively. The elements (assets, threats and controls)
of each vector are the distinct elements that have been elicited from stakeholders and pertain to the decision situation under
consideration. We can characterize each asset, threat, and control element as the vectors:
An = {PA1, …,PAs, …,PAS},

where PAs denotes the sth attribute associated with element As.

Tm = {PT1, …, PTu, …, PTU},

where PTu denotes the uth attribute associated with element Tm.

Cr = {PC1, …, PCv, …, PCV},

where PCv denotes the vth attribute associated with element Cr.

At this level (hereafter referred to as level 1), the decision space is comprised of three sub-spaces, namely, an asset space, a
threat space, and a control space. Each decision sub-space can then be described using a set of matrices that capture the
evaluation of each element (asset, threat, or control) with respect to the corresponding attributes as well as the preference
structure towards the various attributes. Since our space allows for the representation of many simultaneous attributes, we can
treat the simple prioritization of assets, threats, and controls as a special case of an MCDM model. For example, regarding
assets, we can visualize the corresponding decision space as shown in Figure 2 where we have a number of assets, e.g.,
customer information, software, etc. that are evaluated and prioritized against a number of attributes such as replacement
cost, replacement time, criticality, etc.
Next, we can build a representation space for analysis of comparisons between elements, corresponding to their interactions
with one another (hereafter referred to as level 2). We can fully describe this part of the analysis space in terms of three subspaces, namely, threats versus assets (MTA = VT × VA), threats versus controls (MTC = VT × VC), and assets versus controls
(MTA = VT × VA). Similar to level 1, each decision sub-space also includes a set of attributes as shown in Figure 3 for the
‘Risk’ attribute. For example, elements for asset-threat combinations may include elements such as “Customer data-Virus
attack”, while attributes in this decision sub-space may include quantitative risk, defined formally in the classical risk
analysis as the product of the cost or loss attributed to an exposure and the probability of an exposure (Courtney, 1977), along
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Asset
attributes

with a qualitative assessment of perceived risk. Accordingly, at this level, MCDM techniques allow the decision maker to
rank and prioritize various asset-threat, threat-control, and asset-control combinations against their respective attributes.

Assets
Figure 2. Asset decision sub-space
Taking asset-threat-control combinations we can define an additional decision sub-space (hereafter referred to as level 3),
thereby capturing three dimensional decision attributes. Examples of such attributes include effectiveness of a particular
control in protecting an asset against a specific threat, and performance impact to an asset by imposing a specific control
upon a specific threat.
Using the Model

To use the model, we require first a set of basic elements: assets, threats, and controls. This first stage is preparatory, as it
defines the alternatives which are the subject of the inquiry, which will be evaluated against one another. Baskerville (1993)
refers to this aspect as a “first generation” security method: the study of the entire repertoire of elements available for a
system. We then associate each of these elements with a set of distinct attribute criteria, common between each elemental
type but distinct from one another. Thus each asset Aq is associated with a distinct set of attribute criteria (Aqc1, Aqc2, …
Aqcm), each threat Tr with criteria (Trc1, Trc2, … Trcn) and each control Cs with (Csc1, Csc2, … Cscp).

Th
re
a

t

Risk

The first improvement offered by the explicit representation of the decision sub-spaces consists of the incorporation of
multiple-criteria decision-making (MCDM) as an implicit part of preference capturing. This extends the utility of such a tool,
elevating security decision-making from what the literature identifies as crude cost/benefit techniques and increasing its
flexibility. But again, utilizing the model solely in this way fails to take advantage of the potentially iterative nature of
organizational knowledge collection, and it does not directly serve to aid in bridging the managerial/technical gap.

Asset
Figure 3. Asset-threat decision sub-space (shown for ‘Risk’ as a representative attribute)
Expanded use of the proposed framework begins with the eliciting of stakeholder concerns, through providing a list of
potential issues, polling opinion or collecting input directly, or through a combination of such methods. These concerns are
captured by the system, and then can be prioritized and categorized. In a group decision support setting, we can use a simple
or weighted average, or construct a hierarchy, to accurately represent these concerns in accord with the significance of
individual inputs to the whole organization. This is conceived to be an iterative process of refinement, and if used as such,
cross-functional dialog can be greatly facilitated. Comparison of alternatives within each of the identified dimensions of the
analysis space can then occur. This process gradually builds a knowledge base of elemental “facts” upon which the analysis
space will draw, and fills in the elements of that analysis space.
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Second, the analysis proper must take place. By narrowing the analysis space to elements of interest, a holistic picture
emerges from the raw data. The utility of the model lies in its modular nature: taking the basic dimensions of threats,
controls, and assets, we can narrow each dimension to include only those items exhibiting characteristics that interest us, and
thus simplify the problem domain in terms of this solution space. Relevant criteria entering into the decision are determined,
and we progress to alternatives generation after comparison is made for each criterion and preferences are captured within the
problem domain. Moreover, the preferences thus elicited are stored for future use by their association with a specific element
(threat, asset, control) and their various combinations, within the decision analysis space.
CASE STUDY

The purpose of the case study is to demonstrate the utility of the framework, first as a tool which facilitates balanced
managerial perception, and second, as an aid to decision-making. We chose to use the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (as
a representative MCDM methodology) to implement two models which would explicitly capture stakeholder preferences.
We briefly explain the basics of the methodology and then proceed to a demonstration, based in part upon a consultation with
the Vice President of Technology and managing security officer of a major financial services firm.
AHP, defined in Saaty (1980), is a technique for evaluating and ranking a finite number of alternatives with respect to a
number of criteria (decision attributes). The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), as developed by Saaty (1980), is a
particularly attractive candidate and representative pair-wise comparison MCDM method which is appropriate to our
identified purposes. AHP has been widely applied to a large variety of problems in economics and business operations
(Saaty, 1982) as well as information systems, in the existing literature, and has an extensive history of use. Its primary
advantage is the ease of making relative comparisons for the stakeholder in an intuitive way, the ability to capture qualitative
as well as quantitative evaluations for the various alternatives, the compatibility with group decision making techniques, and
the ability to account for dynamic creation of hierarchy levels to any desired level of granularity.
AHP provides for a quantitative pair-wise comparison of alternatives. The process then uses the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors of the resulting comparison matrices. The resulting comparison matrices are each associated with a particular
three-valued tuple in our analysis space, relative to a particular problem domain for which an AHP model is constructed.
AHP naturally leads itself to the types of analysis that can be incorporated in the analysis space we have defined.
The following sub-sections describe each of the models, the results, and the feedback obtained from the aforementioned
executives.
Model #1

The model. As shown in Figure 4, the goal for this particular model formulation is to select a security control. At the first
level of the hierarchy is a list of relevant assets, which server as the decision criteria in the AHP model. Pairwise comparing
these assets against the goal captures the decision maker’s perception towards the importance of these assets. In other words,
prioritize the assets according to the overall perception of the decision maker. The next level in the hierarchy denotes the
threats pertinent to each asset. By pairwise comparing each group of threats against their respective asset, the model captures
the decision maker’s perception regarding the importance of each threat against each asset. Such perception may implicitly
include perception of severity, risk, and exposure (vulnerability). The lowest level (not shown in Figure 4) lists the specific
controls (shown in Figure 5) considered in this model. We used the controls identified through the survey conducted in
Whitman (2003). We added additional controls relevant to the particular organization in the course of our discussions, and fit
them within this same framework.
Results and discussion. Given the preference structure of the decision maker, customer information and data center security
ranked highest in terms of importance. Moreover, for customer information, threat to confidentiality was perceived as of
highest importance followed by threats to integrity and availability. Again, we can see that these are qualitative threat issues,
which could furthermore be broken down into greater detail. For software, acts of human error ranked highest, while for data
center security, power outage was perceive as the most important.
Synthesizing the preferences and control evaluations regarding the criteria, ‘media backup’ and ‘no outside connections’
ranked highest. The results were consistent with the decision maker’s expectation, particularly with the decision maker’s
emphasis on customer information. Moreover, through sensitivity analysis, the decision maker can visualize how changes in
their perception regarding the relative importance of assets, or the relative importance of a particular threat on a particular
asset can change the recommended decision. Figure 6 shows how each control ranks in terms of how it is perceived to protect
the assets under consideration. The vertical bars denote the relative importance of the assets. By dynamically manipulating
the priorities, the rank of the control may or may not change depending on the sensitivity of the results to the relative
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importance of the assets. Figure 6b shows the results as the importance of software is increased. In this case, ‘employee
education’ is the top ranked alternative.

Figure 4. Model #1 hierarchy and ranking.

Figure 5. Model #1 ranking of alternatives.
Model #2

The model. Similar to model #1, the goal of this model is the selection of appropriate security controls. However, model #2
presents a different perspective of the decision space. As shown in Figure 7, the first level of the decision hierarchy lists the
decision criteria considered when selecting among multiple controls. By explicitly capturing the potential conflict between
the cost of the controls and the desired risk exposure, the decision maker can gain a better understanding of the inherent
trade-offs among the controls under consideration. Regarding ‘risk’, the model captures the decision maker’s perceptions
regarding the risks of various asset-threat combinations. It is worth noting that while the input from the decision maker may
reflect the results of a detailed quantitative risk assessment of asset-threat combinations, such assessment may not be required
due to the qualitative nature of the inputs required by the model.
Results and discussion. Given the preference structure of the decision maker, ‘risk’ ranked at a higher priority over ‘cost’.
Moreover, regarding ‘risk’, the risk of compromising the confidentiality of customer information ranked highest followed by
the risk of disrupting the availability of customer information as shown in Figure 7. Again, we can see that qualitative threats
can be incorporated along with physical, quantifiable threats Synthesizing the preferences and control evaluations regarding
the criteria, ‘intrusion detection’ and ‘Firewall’ ranked highest as shown in Figure 8. The results were consistent with the
decision maker’s expectation, particularly, with the decision maker’s emphasis on the risk exposure for customer information
confidentiality and availability, given the nature of the business. Similar to model #1, sensitivity analysis allows the decision
maker to visualize the trade-offs involved at any level of the hierarchy, e.g., cost-risk trade-offs and trade-offs among various
asset-threat pairs with respect to risk exposure.
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Figure 6a. Model #1 sensitivity analysis – Base scenario.

Figure 6b. Model #1 sensitivity analysis – Alternate scenario.

Figure 7. Model #2 hierarchy and ranking.
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Figure 8. Model #2 ranking of alternatives.
CONCLUSION

As security becomes increasingly relevant in business as well as daily life, and we are gradually ensconced in a ubiquitous
sea of information technology, the need for effective security planning, design, and management methodologies and
intellectual tools is becoming more important than ever. Nevertheless, existing methodologies and tools for security planning
and design are often plagued by a number of issues. Examples of such issues include the inability to capture the multitude of
factors involved in security decision making, the difficulty in monetizing values and assets needed for quantitative risk
analysis methodologies, the difficulty of capturing perceptions of the various stakeholders, and the ever widening gap among
the perceptions of various stakeholders.
Within this paper, we suggest that the incorporation of multi-criteria decision making techniques into information systems
security planning and design can make a significant contribution towards improving this situation. The ability to directly
represent multiple attributes of the basic security elements through the conceptual tool of a multidimensional decision
analysis space is a useful idea in achieving this purpose. The possibility of involving multiple levels of the organization in
the decision process, eliciting the preferences, knowledge and expertise cross-departmentally, is in our opinion worthy of
significant future research. Decision support can serve as both a tool for facilitating correct perception and as an aid to the
decision-making process itself.
The case study involving members from a major financial service provider only served to strengthen our perceptions. They
clearly identified issues of business concern to them which could not be easily dealt with: the ability to provide top
management with clear and non-technical justifications for issues in security policy and decision and the disconnection which
exists between top management’s perception of organizational security and the institutional reality.
Of course, this is not to suggest security decision support can become a panacea, but rather to advance the hypothesis that
MCDM techniques, which have already been applied successfully to a variety of domains related to social and policy issues,
could make a valuable contribution to enhancing the existing information security literature as well as possessing a positive
organizational impact.
Further work related to the issues advanced herein will examine the applicability of a variety of multi-criteria techniques,
particularly with respect to group decision making. The conceptual tool of a decision analysis space for security, which has
been roughly defined within this paper, can be further expanded upon in both representative and judgmental contexts. From a
practitioner’s perspective, the proposed framework and model for the decision analysis space can form the basis of a new
generation of security planning and design tools.
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